Despite its recent origins (the first Salon was held in 1992), MAKS is steeped in history. As President Vladimir Putin proudly noted in his welcoming address, MAKS “continues the longstanding tradition of aviation parades and air show holidays that has always existed in Russia.” His statement was no boast. Tsarist Russia opened its first “International Week of Aviation” in April 1910, just three months after Los Angeles-area aviation patrons hosted the first such meet in the United States. Dozens more events were held in Russia during the years leading up to 1917. In the Soviet period, public air shows, exhibitions, and spectacles were commonplace as Communist Party leaders exploited aviation to generate public faith in (and foreign fear of) their country’s military might.

MAKS is, by definition, an international event. However, its primary purpose has always been to showcase and promote the accomplishments of the Russian aerospace industry. President Putin’s opening day assertion that his government’s main task “is maintaining our leadership in the production of military aviation technology,” [emphasis added] should be understood in this light. It’s a classic example of “compensatory symbolism:” the historic propensity of Russian officials to exaggerate technological accomplishments and military standing in order to mask weakness and deficiencies vis-à-vis foreign rivals. That President Putin should sense a need to embellish the truth doubtless stems from the precipitous decline in Russian air power that followed the collapse of the USSR in 1991 and from continuing doubts about the current status of the post-Soviet air weapon.

Recent innovations on display at MAKS-2007 such as the S-400 air defense system, the 3M25 “Meteorit” cruise missile, and the latest models of Su-35 and MiG-29 aircraft notwithstanding, the Russian military’s current aviation inventory hardly garners the full respect of aerospace observers. Moscow-based defense analyst Pavel Felgenhauer dismissed the Sukhoi and MiG aircraft appearing at the Salon as “flying toys that have not been launched for production.” Commenting on Moscow’s decision last week to resume long-range bomber patrols, US State Department spokesman Sean McCormack brushed off the development stating that “If Russia feels as though they want to take some of these old aircraft out of mothballs and get them flying again, that’s their decision.” Meanwhile, in separate editorials published Wednesday in The Daily Mail and The Daily Telegraph, Max Hastings and David Blair dismissed out of hand Russia’s pretensions at once again becoming a major military power citing, among other things, the country’s underlying poverty, economic inequality, and industrial backwardness.

While Hastings may be correct that Russians “cannot make toasters or microwaves, washing-machines or cookers that could find an export market anywhere outside Cuba,” he and other Western observers would be well advised not to underestimate the abilities of Russian aerospace engineers. Likewise, they should not underestimate the value that the Russian state places on air power. It is not happenstance that Putin has presided over the opening ceremony at every MAKS event held during his presidency. He is keenly interested in aviation. And he has repeatedly expressed his goal of re-establishing Russia as a key player in the international market. His administration has undertaken concrete steps to realize that goal. Chief among these has been the formation of the United Aircraft Corporation (UAC), an umbrella organization that has brought previously independent Russian aircraft firms like Suhkoi, MiG, and Tupolev under a single administrative entity controlled by the state. This, too, has clear parallels in Russia’s Soviet and Imperial pasts. Throughout the course of the twentieth century it was the state, not private enterprise, that controlled, promoted, and sustained domestic aviation. It appears that the same may be set to happen in the twenty-first century.

Having survived very difficult times in the 1990s following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian aviation is currently experiencing a renaissance. And once again, the Russian state is serving as mid-wife. Flush with cash thanks to the revenues generated from the sale of oil, gas, and other natural resources, the Putin administration is sinking billions into the refurbishment of aviation infrastructure, the design and construction of new aircraft, and the creation of international partnerships with companies like Boeing and Airbus. These partnerships will provide Russia access to the advanced technology it needs later to compete independently against American and European manufacturers.

In mid-August UAC President Aleksei Fyodorov proclaimed that the Russian Federation will surpass Soviet-era production levels by building 4,500 civilian aircraft over the next 18 years. If the government is to make good on this audacious target, it will have to find buyers for these new planes. Recent announcements regarding the pending sale of advanced Sukhoi fighters to Iran and Venezuela suggest still further ties to past precedent. While many in the West view these new deals as efforts designed to score geopolitical points at the expense of the US, such contracts are far more important as inroads to negotiating sales of the new civilian airliners expected to roll out of Russian factories beginning in 2015. It’s a strategy that hearkens back to the 1950s and 1960s when, unable to find buyers for their civilian aircraft in the West, the Soviet Union secured passenger aircraft contracts with Third World governments by sweetening deals for Ilyushin and Tupolev carriers with offers of MiG and Sukhoi fighters.

When analysts like Felgenhauer and Hastings characterize Putin’s agenda as a Cold-War throwback destined to fail owing to economic weakness and industrial backwardness they are mistaken. Putin’s approach, in fact, is a well-tested model that has very deep roots in Russian history. At the turn of the eighteenth century Imperial Russia’s “Westernizing” tsar Peter the Great borrowed heavily from Europe, importing technology, expertise, and equipment while using state authority and finances to spur development at home. In very short order he transformed Russia from a backward, impoverished, and peripheral also-ran into one of Europe’s leading military powers. The Soviet Union accomplished much the same thing in the 1930s through the state-directed industrialization campaign launch by Josef Stalin. Although the modernization programs under both Peter and Stalin came at a steep price for the country’s ordinary citizens and ultimately proved only qualified successes, they radically altered Europe’s military and political landscapes by quickly vaulting Russia into the ranks of the major powers. The events surrounding MAKS-2007 suggest that Russian officials are hoping to alter radically the aerospace landscape in the years to come. They also suggest that Russia’s approach to rebuilding its air arm will follow tried and true patterns derived from its history.

Peter the Great is alleged to have quipped: “We need Europe for a few decades, and then we must show her our ass.”

It is not difficult to imagine that Vladimir Putin is thinking the same thing.

ScP

Effectively, the industry is entering a third phase in its post-Soviet existence. At first, the issue was merely staying afloat; then the focus turned to serving the large domestic market and shoring up the sector’s financial wherewithal. Now, airlines and manufacturers have ambitions beyond the confines of Russia and its immediate neighbors.

For the rest of the run-down on recent developments, click here.

It’s far too early to tell whether or not the Chinese will succeed in the goal of overtaking their Western competitors. Either way, coupled with their on-going efforts to gain a foothold in the regional air market with the upcoming launch of the ARJ21 (and the concurrent development of the Sukhoi Superjet 100 in Russia) the announcement underscores the significance attached by the communist government to the aerospace industry.

ScP

Now, according to a report in this morning’s New York Times, two really big pieces of American aviation history are up for sale.

Possessing a wingspan of 200 ft and a lift capacity of 32,000 lbs, the 117-ft. long Model 170 “Mars” built by the Glen L. Martin Company was the largest flying boat ever to enter production. From the time of its debut in 1938 until the 1947 appearance of the B-36, it was the largest plane in America’s military arsenal. Originally dubbed an “experimental patrol bomber,” the prototype Model 170 was intended to serve as the first of what would ultimately become a fleet of “flying battleships” set to patrol the skies over the Pacific armed with huge bomb loads as well as Marine paratroopers.

Although the Model 170 never saw duty as a combat aircraft, six more Model 170s built between 1943 and 1948 did enter service. They functioned as transport planes during the Second World War and Korean War.

By 1959 only four of the “Mars” aircraft remained. These were sold to Flying Tankers, Inc. a Canadian firm formed to battle fires by a consortium of forest companies. Flying Tankers fitted 7,200 gallon tanks onto three of the aircraft, transforming them into “water bombers.” Two of the four planes were subsequently lost in service. But the remaining two have been in operation for the last four decades. Now, it seems, the cost of maintaining and servicing the behemoths has grown so expensive that Flying Tankers’ parent company has decided to put the aircraft up for sale.

Interested buyers can contact the sellers here.

The Glen L. Martin Aviation Museum (which is, incidentally, trying to raise enough money through donations to purchase one of the planes) has a very good article on the history of the Mars planes.

ScP

Given the harsh climate in which the vehicle will operate, the development of the Meridian poses a number of challenges, not the least of which are the needs to create anti-icing concepts to keep the aircraft aloft and temperature-control systems for shielding its electronic systems. In the meantime, the project is providing an ideal laboratory for preparing students to work with technologies that will increasingly define aviation in the twenty-first century.

ScP

The decision comes as no real surprise, indicating the Russian state’s interest in maintaining good relations with both the American company and the European consortium.

ScP

In a joint statement issued yesterday, EADS co-chairmen Manfred Bischoff and Arnaud Lagardère dismissed the Russian demand as impossible under the terms of the company’s governance agreement, noting that:

“The existing corporate governance rules and structure have proved their efficiency for all shareholders. It would not be in the interest of the company to change corporate governance or enlarge the group of industrial shareholders,”

The recent and unwelcome maneuvering by the Russians has been made possible by two factors: burgeoning oil and natural gas revenues which have added billions to the Russian state’s coffers and a concomitant, precipitous collapse of EADS’s market value. Since issuing a profits warning in late July thanks, largely, to continuing problems with the delivery of Airbus’s new A380 passenger craft, EADS has seen its stock decline by 25%.

Complicating matters is the fact that Airbus (along with its American competitor Boeing) awaits a decision by Putin’s government on the purchase of 44 aircraft for the Russian state airline Aeroflot. A final decision on the purchase, valued at around $6 billion, has been repeatedly (and, no doubt, intentionally) delayed.

Clearly, Russian demands for a greater stake in EADS are part of the Kremlin’s ongoing maneuvers to squeeze the best possible deals from the two foreign rivals in advance of the decision on the Aeroflot purchase. Having rebuffed the Kremlin on a greater roles in their company, EADS officials may now find it necessary to offer other concessions in order to secure a purchase contract with Aeroflot.

In then end, though, Putin’s government may well decide that its most advantageous course is to split the difference and place two orders for 22 planes from each of its foreign suitors. Doing so would enable Russia to maintain cordial relations (and continuing influence) with both of the world’s leading aircraft firms, keeping all future options open as it moves forward with a desperately needed overhaul of its civilian and military aviation sectors.

ScP

Although Sgt. Cook’s experiences may seem strikingly familiar to passengers who flew Aeroflot in the 1980s or early 1990s, the reality, of course, is that flying in Russia today is significantly more comfortable and reliable than in years past. Indeed, since the mid-1990s, Aeroflot, as well as regional carriers like Sibir and Trans Aero, have made progress in improving their passenger service and, more importantly, their safety records. Still, progress is relative. There is a great deal of work that remains to be done before Russian domestic aviation can begin to be considered on par with that in the USA or Western Europe.

The Russian Federation’s Transport Minister, Igor Levitin, acknowledged as much this past March (before the recent spate of deadly accidents) when he declared that as many as one half of the 5,000 civilian aircraft being used in Russia “are only good for spare parts.” Levitin went on to warn that the country’s continuing inability to improve its domestic aviation service has become a “threat to Russia’s security.”

Just over a week ago, on September 1st, the Transport Ministry appeared to take a step toward addressing Russia’s pressing civilian aviation needs when it announced plans to abolish duties currently levied upon equipment imported from abroad. The Ministry cited its desire to improve safety as the chief impetus for the abolition of the duties. That announcement came on the heels of a decision by Russia’s second-largest bank, VneshTorgBank, to invest nearly $1 billion in order to acquire a 5% stake in the European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company (EADS).

Ironically, much of the improvement that has already taken place in Russian air transport over the past decade can be credited to upgrades in the civilian air fleet as Aeroflot and other carriers have replaced their obsolete, Soviet-era Tupolev and Antonov aircraft with new, or “newer,” Boeing and Airbus models. The trouble is, while reducing duties on future imports and creating partnerships with foreign firms may hasten the modernization of Russia’s air fleets, new planes alone will not resolve the systemic problems facing Russian aviation.

Russian air transport faces a number of daunting hurdles. One of the largest and most difficult to overcome is the overcrowded and poor conditions at airports across the county. Moscow’s principal international hub, state-owned Sheremetyevo airport, is but the most striking case in point. Despite being relatively new (its main Terminal 2 was built for the 1980 Moscow Olympics), Sheremetyevo is notoriously shabby. Its dark, dank, and disorganized interior and insanely long customs and check-in procedures recall the miseries inflicted upon travelers to the USSR in the 1970s and 80s. Fed up with the airport, British Air moved its Moscow hub to the smaller, privately-held Domodedovo airport in the summer of 2003. Other European carriers have such as Lufthansa and Alitalia have considered doing the same. After years of dithering, state officials finally responded in March of this year, granting Germany’s largest construction company, Hochtief, a $300 million dollar contract to upgrade Sheremetyevo-2. The reconstruction plans call for expanding the terminal to 240,000 square meters in order to accommodate a yearly capacity of 18 million passengers and creating a link to the airport’s future Terminal 3. The project is to be completed by 2007.

Meanwhile, work continues on a more comprehensive proposal to upgrade other sites in the country’s air network. One early draft has called for the construction of extra runways at twelve of Russia’s largest airports including Sheremetyevo, Domodedovo, and Vnukovo (in Moscow) and Pulkovo (St. Petersburg), as well as airports in Krasnodar and Ekaterinburg. The Ministry has stated that the Russian Federation needs to invest, at a minimum, 25-30 billion rubles (approx. $1 billion) for the reconstruction of the country’s aviation infrastructure.

In reality, the amount needed to bring Russia’s aviation infrastructure into line with European and American standards is far, far higher. After all, if the state is prepared to budget $300 million just to upgrade and expand Sheremetyevo-2, the $1 billion figure cited for upgrades to other airports around the country is hardly realistic, even as a “minimum.”

Herein lies the biggest challenge facing Russian aviation: coming up with the vast amounts of money necessary to pay for all that needs to be done.

ScP

Given the frequency with which Iran’s aging and poorly maintained planes inadvertently return to earth, Friday’s aerial disaster hardly comes as a shock.

Still, the crash of the Tupolev is unwelcome news for Russia’s beleaguered aviation program. On the same day that the Iran Airtour plane went down, Russian President Vladimir Putin announced that he is charging Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov with the task of improving Russian civilian and military aviation safety. Vladimir Vladimirovich’s (TM) actions come in direct response to a spate of accidents since May that have claimed the lives of 410 people in the airspace over the former Soviet Union (FSU).

Putin’s choice of Defense Minister Ivanov is telling. It is another signal that the Russian President is intent on drawing the country’s aviation programs under still firmer state control.

ScP

Arguably, the low-point for Russian civilian aviation came on 23 March 1994 when an Aeroflot-operated Airbus A-310 en route from Moscow to Hong Kong crashed near the town of Mezhduretshensk. The post-crash investigation revealed that the disaster had occurred as a result of “pilot error” when the flight captain’s fifteen-year old son (who had been allowed to man the plane’s controls) inadvertently disconnected the autopilot. The crash killed all 75 people aboard the plane.

Since then, Aeroflot and many of Russia’s regional carriers (like Pulkovo, Sibir, and TransAero) have worked hard to improve service, upgrade their air fleets, and strengthen safety standards. By and large their efforts have paid dividends. And yet…

Tuesday’s news that a Tupolev-154 operated by Pulkovo Air crashed near Donetsk, Ukraine en route from the Black Sea resort town Anapa to St. Petersburg, killing all 170 passengers aboard the plane, cannot help but raise questions about the current status of civilian aviation in Russia and the regions of the former Soviet Union. Initial reports suggest that inclement weather may have played a role in bringing the plane down. Still, this is the third major aviation disaster to occur in the airspace over the former Soviet Union since the spring of this year.

Last month, a Sibir Air A310 slid off a wet runway while landing in Irkutsk. The plane struck a concrete barrier before bursting into flames. 122 people were killed in the crash. Only two months earlier, on May 3rd, an A320 operated by the Armenian airline Armavia went down in the Black Sea during its final approach to the Russian resort city Sochi. Pilot error appears to have been the cause of that crash, which claimed the lives of all 113 people on board.

2006 has not been a good year for Russian aviation. And there are still four months left.

ScP